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Technology-Forcing Regulation: The Case of
Automobile Emissions Technology
Beth Hilkemeyer
Recently there have been many calls for a new rela-
tionship between business and the environment.
People worldwide are concerned about environmental
degradation and about the relationship between indus-
trial development and the health of the environment.
Environmental technology is considered a growing area
in which the United States could develop a competitive
advantage. As Vice President Al Gore asserts in his
influential book, Earth in the Balance, leadership on the
environment is "in our economic interest," and "we can
prosper by leading the environmental revolution and
producing for the world marketplace the new products
and technologies that foster economic progress without
environmental destruction." 1 There is also a call for a
change in the way that government interacts with busi-
ness to promote environmental protection. Some state
that government should "make markets work"2 through
the use of economic incentives, and others believe that
government should directly promote research and de-
velopment.
However, government promotion of technological
innovation is nothing new. "Technology-forcing" poli-
cies were used over 20 years ago-in the 1970 Clean Air
Act-to force innovation within the automobile indus-
try. This article presents a brief case study of this effort:
the development of emissions technology for mobile
sources that is, automobiles and light trucks, under the
1970 Act. This effort was only one part of the Act, which
Beth Hilkemeyer is a second-year Master of Regional
Planning student at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. This article grew out of work begun last
summer at Resources for the Future, an environmental
policy think-tank in Washington, D. C. Hilkemeyer is cur-
rently completingher degree in Vienna, Austria, studying at
the Wirtschaftsuniversitaet Wien (Vienna University of
Business and Economics).
also regulated stationary sources such as electric utili-
ties. An important lesson from this case study is that
policies to promote technological innovation often must
reflect complex interactions between the technical prob-
lem itself, industrial structure, and the political process.
In the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, sev-
eral new types of policy instruments have been included
in both the mobile and stationary source provisions [see
sidebar, page 1 1]. This article does not discuss these pro-
visions, although it will be interesting to see what the
response of industry is to this latest attempt to force
technology.
The History of the 1970 Clean Air Act
Smog, defined as hazy and irritating photochemical
air pollution, first appeared in Los Angeles in the early
1940s. Since that time it has been responsible for dam-
age to buildings, crops, and human health. The severe
problemwhich developed in Los Angeles led to research
implicating the automobile as a significant polluter, and
then to legislation in California in the early 1960s which
required the use of emissions control devices after they
had passed a certification process.
Over time, smog became a national problem. Succes-
sive federal air quality legislation culminated in the
Clean Air Act of 1970. This ambitious legislation set
"technology-forcing" emission standards for 1975 model-
year cars and also regulated stationary sources. The
technology-forcing emissions standards were set to protect
human health and were set beyond the capabilities of
then-known technologies. One of the reasons for this
approach was the suspicion that auto companies were
not doing all that they could to develop and implement
control technologies. It was thought that the combina-
tion of tough standards and a short deadline (five years)
would force the auto companies to devote more re-
sources to solving this problem.
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The 1975 standards were not met on time. The dead-
line was rolled-back several times and standards were
finally met during the 1980s. During this time, technol-
ogy advanced incrementally. Early responses to the leg-
islation first included engine modifications and then
simple catalytic converters. Later, three-way catalytic
converters, capable of controlling all three major ex-
haust pollutants, and microprocessors were introduced.
Despite this progress, ambient air quality in many
urban areas is still not adequate to protect human health.3
Many reasons can be given for this including the possi-
bility that a more radical change in automotive technol-
ogy is needed-a move away from the gasoline-powered
internal combustion engine. However, it should be noted
thai technology is not the only, and perhaps not even a
sufficient, avenue towards attainment of this goal for all
urban areas:
Whenwe analyze the failure of the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments to reduce pollution from automobiles
to the extent envisioned by Congress, several factors
stand out. First, the growth in the total number of
automobile vehicle miles travelled every year, com-
bined with less stringent control requirements for
other mobile sources, reduces the overall gains achieved
by the standards that apply to the individual automo-
bile. Moreover, the standards as such are not achiev-
ing the full benefit intended, mainly because of poor
vehicle maintenance. Deterioration in fuel quality
and the stipulation in the law that emission-control
requirements apply only for five years or 50,000 miles-
-roughly half the lifetime of a ear-also contribute to
the problem. 4
This article is concerned with only one piece of the
pie: the development ofemissions technology. The story
of this technology is largely the story of the catalytic
converter, presented below.
The Catalytic Converter
Catalytic converters are tailpipe devices that use cata-
lysts mounted on a metal honeycomb or on pellets to
change harmful gases to less harmful ones. The chemical
processes and the basic design of converters were con-
ceived early in the development of emissions control
systems, and prototypes had been developed as early as
1957. However, these early prototypes did not meet
common-sense requirements for implementation: they
were too big, they did not reduce hydrocarbon and
carbon monoxide emissions sufficiently, they were costly,
their replacement costs were high, and they did not last
long. Durability and cost were the chief problems. Cata-
lytic converters were "poisoned" by the lead in gasoline
so they soon stopped working. In addition, the catalysts
often used precious (and expensive) metals such as plati-
num. The durability problem was greatly eased by the
introduction of unleaded gasoline in the 1970s.
The development of an effective catalytic control
device was difficult. First, the device had to operate
effectively for years under conditions of high tempera-
ture and changing gas mixtures in the exhaust. Second,
the catalysts were originally designed to "clean" only
some components of emissions. The later introduction
of microprocessors allowed the precise control of gases
in the exhaust and therefore, the use of catalysts that
were better able to "clean" more components of emis-
sions.
Development of the catalytic converter was not con-
sistently pursued from its genesis in 1957 through to its
widespread adoption in the mid-1970s. During the 1960s
the automobile industry had largely abandoned research
on this technology because engine modifications and
other technologies met the needs ofthe California stan-
dards.4 Intensive research was begun after the passage of
the 1970 Clean Air Act.5
Specific factors constrained the rapid development of
the catalytic converter prior to and following the adop-
tion of the 1970 legislation:
The high cost ofinstallation and maintenance. Under the
1970 act, legislators balanced costs against the bene-
fits ofbetter emissions control by requiring durability
of only 50,000 miles. This meant that the consumer
would not have to replace the catalytic converter.
The needfor coordination with other industries (here, the
petroleum industry). The widespread adoption of the
catalytic converter coincided with the requirement
that new cars use unleaded fuel.
The nature ofthe technology itself. A lot of vibration and
great variation in temperature take place within an
automobile. Catalytic converters were originally not
rugged enough, and are still not effective over the
entire temperature range of operation. Microproces-
sors have increased the effectiveness of catalytic
converters by more closely controlling combustion.
Criticisms of the 1970 Clean Air Act's
"Technology-Forcing" Approach
The above description of the development of the
catalytic converter touches on some of the complexities
that were involved in the development of this technol-
ogy. One criticism of the 1970 Act is that it did not
acknowledge these complexities. Even prior to subse-
quent deadlines, some analysts criticized the structure
of the Clean Air Act. One book from this period, Clear-
ing the Air: Federal Policy on Automotive Emissions
Control, states "the regulatory mechanisms set up in the
Clean Air Act are too primitive for the complex techni-
cal and manufacturing processes to which they have
been applied."6
The 1970 Clean Air Act's "technology-forcing" pro-
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Clean Air Chronology-
1925 -Public Health Service, a federal agency, studied
carbon monoxide in automobile exhaust.
1940s -Smog first noticed in the Los Angeles area.
1943 -"Daylight Dimout" on September 8 in Los Ange-
les.
1947 -AirPollution ControlAct allowed California coun-
ties to establish air pollution control districts al-
though permits could not be used on motor vehicles.
-Stanford Research Institute (SRI) began studying air
pollution.
1948 -20 deaths and 6,000 cases of illness in Donora,
Pennsylvania and up to 800 deaths in London, Eng-
land are attributed to poor air quality.
1951 -Dr. AJ. Haagen-Smit at the California Institute
of Technology identified the basic processes that
create photochemical smog. Motor vehicle emissions
identified as the major source of pollutants.
1952 -Payne and Sigworth concluded that blowby was
not a significant source of air pollutants.
1953 -Automobile manufacturers formed the "Vehicle
Combustion Products Committee," under the aus-
pices of the Automobile Manufacturers Association
to study pollution. Air Pollution Foundation (APF)
was founded.
1954 -APF conference held in August on automotive en-
gineering design and exhaust control devices.
-Emergency grants awarded to the University of Cali-
fornia and to the Public Health Department for accel-
erated research.
1955 -Automobile manufacturers signed a cross-licens-
ing agreement for free access to any emissions control
patent owned by member firms.
-Auto companies began work on a device to curb
tailpipe hydrocarbon emissions by 30 to 50 percent.
-APF affirmed Haagen-Smit's findings and determined
relative role of the refineries.
-APCD established its Automotive Combustion Labo-
ratory
1956 -APF concluded that motorvehicles were the prin-
ciple contributor to smog.
-APCD called a meeting of chemical and auto acces-
sory firms to stimulate interest in the development of
an emissions control device.
1957 -First catalytic converter prototypes were devel-
oped by Ford and GM. Auto industry presented the
results of a three-year study on induction devices.
1959 -Engineers at GM found that blowbywas a signifi-
cant source of emissions.
-California legislature directed the Department of
Health to adopt standards for community air quality,
and in particular, for motor vehicles.
-Exhaust emissions standards were set by the Depart-
ment of Public Health.
1960 -APF wrote that auto companies could have con-
trol devices to test within one year.
-GM developed crankcase device.
-Motor Vehicle Pollution ControlAct established a Motor
Vehicle Pollution Control Board (MVPCB) within
the California Department of Health to certify con-
trol devices and require their use.
-Crankcase emissions standards set by the Department
of Public Health.
-SchenckAct adopted in which Congress directed the
Surgeon General to report on the effects of motor
vehicle exhaust on human health.
1961 -Most American vehicle manufacturers voluntar-
ily installed crankcase controls on vehicles marketed
in California.
-MVPCB certified a GM crankcase device, which later
proved to be defective.
-Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
warned that if blowby devices were not placed on all
cars, he would recommend that mandatory legisla-
tion be passed by Congress.
1962 -Up to 700 deaths were attributed to the "Killer
Smog" which hit London in December.
-Several crankcase devices were certified. California
legislature made improved crankcase devices manda-
tory on new American-made cars starting with the
1964 model year, and upon change of ownership
within certain counties.
-Air Pollution Control Act is extended for two years.
Studies called for in the Schenck Act are made a
permanent task of the Surgeon General.
1963 -Most American vehicle manfuacturers voluntar-
ily install crankcase devices nationwide.
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Legislation and Regulation
-Clean Air Act
,
amending the Air Pollution Control
Act of 1955, is adopted, directing the Department of
HEW work with industry representatives on fuel and
emissions technology, and to develop criteria on the
effects of air pollution and its control.
1964 -In March, auto companies said there was no way
that they could have a device ready until 1967. But, in
August, after the certification of four devices by the
MVPCB, the companies announced that they had
engine modifications that were superior to the inde-
pendant parts manufacturers.
1965 -Ralph Nader's Unsafe atAny Speed published.
-Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act amended the
Clean Air Act. Directed HEW to set emission stan-
dards for motor vehicles to become effective in 1968.
1966 -November inversion in New York City estimated
to cause 80 deaths.
-All 1966 American-made cars sold in California re-
quired to have exhaust emissions controls and state
legislation switches from a two- to one-device re-
quirement.
-HEW set standards for motor vehicle emissions to be-
come effective for the 1968 model year.
1967 -Inter-Industry Emission Control Program begun
by Ford in conjunction with several oil companies and
foreign manufacturers.
-MVPCB replaced by the Air Resources Board (ARB).
-Air Quality Act amended the Clean Air Act with pro-
visions for assistance to states for vehicle inspection,
registration of fuel additives and federally-designated
air quality control regions, control criteria and sug-
gested control techniques. Only California could
establish new vehicle provisions more stringent than
federal ones.
1968 -Pure AirAct included specific emission standards
for HC, CO, and NOx for 1970 and 1972 models and
provided that the ARB was to conduct assembly line
testing. The ARB could make standards more strin-
gent.
-1968 model cars subject to emissions standards set by
HEW (based on California's 1967 standards).
-The National Center for Air Pollution Control, the
Automobile Manufacturers Association, and the
Petroleum Institute began a three-year, $10 million
research program on air pollution (none of which
were directed towards developing technologies to
control or prevent emissions.
1969 -The anti-trust division of the U.S. Department of
Justice brought suit against the manufacturers, charg-
ing them with collusion in delaying the development
of emissions control technology. The suit was settled
when the manufacturers agreed to end the cross-
licensing agreement.
1970 -California legislation is passed which 1) creates a
basinwide air pollution control coordinating coun-
cils, and 2)directs the ARB to study the costs and
benefits of vehicle inspection.
-Clean Air Act Amendments set "technology-forcing"
emission standards for automobiles for HC and CO
by 1975 and for NOx by 1976. The National Academy
of Sciences (NAS) was directed to study the techno-
logical feasibility of standards and deadlines and to
submit semiannual reports for use in determining
whether extensions would be granted.
1971 -California requires control of NOx on 1971
model automobiles and passes legislation requiring
theARB to set standards forNOx devices for 1966-71
models. U.S. EPA promulgated uniform national air
quality standards and set emissions standards.
1972 -NAS released its first report.
1973 -EPA granted one-year delays for all standards.
1974 -The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordina-
tionAct delays standards a second year and gives EPA
the power to delay all standards for a third year.
1975 -McJones discovers that disconnecting the spark
advance greatly reduces NOx emissions.
-California alters requirement so that exhaust emis-
sions controls are only required upon initial registra-
tion or transfer of ownership.
-EPA grants another year's delay ofHC and CO stan-
dards because of a possible problem with the produc-
tion of sulfates by catalysts.
1977 -Clean Air Act Amendments delay the 1970 emis-
sions requirements until the early 1980s, set targets
for trucks, set separate standards for vehicles at high
altitudes, and required that these vehicles meet na-
tionwide standards by 1984.
1990 -Clean Air Act Amendments set new emission
standards for various pollutants and air toxics, evapo-
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visions were written to prod auto companies into action,
developing technologies that Congress was confident
that they (or their suppliers) could produce. The dead-
lines written into the law were very ambitious, but the
law also provided for an evaluation of the feasibility of
achieving them on time. Despite this provision, short
deadlines were included because there was a widespread
perception that auto companies were simply resisting
the development of new technologies. Congress was
careful to not specify which technology was to be adopted
by including only performance standards in the legisla-
tion. Unfortunately, Congress' "hands-off" approach to
the choice of technology, combined with its strong push
for rapid development, may have ultimately hindered
widespread innovation and the development of radical
could cause termination of the more imaginative and
complex research approaches and thus delay greatly
the optimum solution to this problem.8
William Abernathy, a scholar of the automotive in-
dustry, has raised other, related issues. He suggests that
technology-forcing regulation may contain a paradox:
"Regulation may encourage rapid incremental progress
and, at the same time, 1) by diverting resources away
from research into them ..., and 2) erecting barriers",
hinder the development of more epochal innovations.9
The National Academy of Sciences Automobile Panel,
in which Abernathy participated, argues that regula-
tions interact with one another to reinforce the existing
technology and that this interaction raises the cost ofde-
Under the 1990Amendments, fuel oxygenation is required in the Durham, North Carolina area due to poor air quality.
veloping new technologies:
improvements. In hindsight, it is possible to identify key
technical, structural, and political considerations that
contributed to the slow progress under the 1970 Clean
Air Act. The following is a discussion ofeach of the three
dimensions.
Technical Considerations
The combination of short deadlines and the use of
performance standards may have discouraged radical
innovation. As a prescient engineer stated early in the
saga of emissions control:
Great care must be taken in developing intelligent
legislation with respect to the car exhaust problem.
The ultimate solution cannot be brought into being in
the first stage of effort. Overrestrictive legislation
As new requirements create new demands, R&D
tasks associated with each change become more
complex, costly, and subject to risks. Each change,
too, becomes more costlywhile at the same time more
changes are required .... In attempting to protect the
innovative process by undertaking piecemeal regula-
tions ... government agencies ... may have created a
sequence of independent regulatory actions that, taken
as a whole, form a tightening web of constraints that
envelop the existing technology. 10 -
Structural Considerations
The 1970 Clean Air Act did not consider the nature of
the automobile industry or the automotive market. The
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Act pushed auto manufacturers to innovate but ignored
the role of the industry's suppliers. This group, histori-
cally a source of numerous inventions, is typically less
able to weather the uncertainty and costs of changing
requirements. The technology-forcing provisions were
designed to push a deep-pocketed yet reluctant industry
rather than to work with capital cycles, the market's
price sensitivity, and other parameters.
The exclusive focus on the auto industry, combined
with a reluctance to specify a preferred technology, also
hindered the development of emissions technology.
Ultimately, the development of the catalytic converter
required inter-industry cooperation. Specifically, the
use of unleaded fuel was required, and the development
of microprocessors aided their effectiveness. However,
because the 1970 Act was not written to promote a
certain technology, it was also not written to martial the
resources of different industries to its development.
Political Considerations
Emissions-control legislation presents a unique po-
litical challenge because of the enormous power ofboth
the consumers, everyonewho may buy a car in the future
-most of thevoting public-and the producers, the auto-
mobile industry. Although other factors besides techno-
logical improvement (for instance, a reduction in driv-
ing) could also contribute to clean air, the power of the
voting public has limited this option. The mood of
Congress is nicely summarized by Gary Bryner in his
recent analysis of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments,
Blue Skies, Green Politics:
The battle between the auto industry and clean air
advocates over the extent to which cleanup can be
achieved through technological controls on tailpipe
emissions has dominated the debate over clean air
legislation .... Aware that technological changes are
less difficult to bring about than changes in the driv-
ing habits of Americans, Congress has hesitated to
impose aggressive transportation control measures. 11
The power of the voting public is also reflected in the
decision to require that any technology last for five years
or 50,000 miles, and to not require as high a level of
emissions reduction after this time. This provision was
designed to keep the public from having to purchase
replacement control equipment, and thus to keep the
cost of the control equipment hidden in the sticker price
of the car. It is possible that, if such durability had not
been required, emissions control could have been im-
plemented earlier.
The auto industry itself presents an unusual situation.
As Douglas Ginsburg, a scholar of regulation, stated:
"automobile regulation faces a special challengc.it applies
to an industry that is at once highly concentrated and
almost unimaginably large and important to the Ameri-
can economy." 12 Ginsburg explains that the small num-
ber of firms in the industry make it possible for firms to
collude, and that it is in the government's interests not to
cause further concentration ofthe industry. 13 The size of
the industry lends it the political power that made sanc-
tions in the 1970 Clean Air Act unfeasible:
The government cannot credibly threaten to impose
severe sanctions when the industry fails to meet a
standard. To prohibit a single domestic firm from
marketing nonconforming vehicles would (1) concen-
trate the market further in the remaining hands; and,
if it is one of the big three firms, (2) have unacceptable
consequences for the national economy. Therefore,
the industry ... has a degree ofimmunity from prosecu-
tion. Since both the industry and the government
know that the Draconian sanctions now provided by
law cannot be used, the industry may be readier to
resist regulation. 15
The 1990 Clean Air Act Mandates
In contrast to the 1970 Act, the 1990 Act has detailed
provisions covering many factors that contribute to
emissions. These provisions cover inspection and main-
tenance, fuels, fueling, economic incentives for consum-
ers such as congestion pricing, evaporation from the gas
tank, measures to discourage single occupancy vehicles,
and many other items.
The 1990 Act also specifies some of the technologies
that are to be phased-in. A notable departure from the
1970 act is the use of pilot programs (California and also
fleet vehicles in urban areas) for radically different auto-
motive technologies, such as electric cars.
A short list of the provisions of the Act include:
1992 - Oxygenated fuels are required in areas which ex-
ceed the carbon monoxide standard.
1994 - Onboard diagnosticcontrol devices to detect emis-
sion-related system malfunctions required on cars and
light trucks.
1996 - Start of the California pilot program with the pro-
duction of 150,000 clean-fueled vehicles annually, to
be increased to 300,000 vehicles by 1999.
By 1998 - New emissions standards phased-in.
By 1998 - Canisters to absorb evaporative emissions
phased-in.
1998 - The sale of very clean gasoline or alternative-
fueled vehicles required in ozone or carbon monoxide
nonattainment areas, if these vehicles have been de-
veloped for the California market.
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Conclusion
Several key considerations for the success of innova-
tion-promoting legislation were illustrated by this case
study. These lessons can be widely applied-they are not
simply restricted to environmental-protection technolo-
gies or to the automobile industry. They form a useful
framework for the consideration of different policies of
variousways to promote government and business inter-
action in the development of technology. These lessons
may be relevant for situations which lend themselves to
"command-and-control" legislation, as was applied in
this case, or to incentive-based solutions:
•Policy makers may need to choose a particular technol-
ogy or devise a program which blends the initial
choice of a preferred technology with incentives for
the development of more effective long-range solu-
tions. 15
•Policy makers need to be aware of an industry's struc-
ture and the behavior of its markets. Some industries
are likely to be much more entrepreneurial because
the industry is relatively new or new markets are
developing for its products. Large, mature industries
(such as the auto industry) however, may be much
more resistant to innovation because of their level of
investment in the status quo. Further, the most likely
source ofinnovation may not be the manufacturer but
the suppliers,who have less capacity to overcome cost
barriers and uncertainty. Policies that provide profit
opportunities will encourage interest in innovation.
•Some technologies require direct government involve-
ment in the development ofstandards and the coordi-
nation of activities among different industries. In this
case, a supply network for unleaded fuel was needed.
If electric cars are promoted in the future, an entirely
new supply network will need to be developed.
Policy makers need to keep an eye on the political
feasibility of provisions and enforcement measures.
Provisions which ultimately lead to "show-downs"
between the government and powerful interests can
be counterproductive.cp
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